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Abstract
Current research on the Kazakhstani youth’s political participation has usually been informed by 
a rather traditional understanding of the concept of political participation, without considering 
the impact of social media and other non-traditional forms of political engagement. This 
article advocates for a more nuanced understanding of political participation in the country, 
and particularly among the younger generation, who – it will be shown, display a wide interest 
in the political developments of the country and are possibly encouraged by a wider access 
to information and social media through the internet. By pushing the boundaries of political 
participation, we suggest that young Kazakhs are more active in political debates than usually 
considered by a number of previous studies. 
Key words: political participation, latent participation, activism, youth, interest in politics, 
Kazakhstan.
Introduction
A large body of scholarship focusing on political participation has been discussing a number of 
formal aspects ranging from voting turnout to citizens’ participation in electoral activities or 
membership of political organisations, such as trade unions and political parties. In contrast, 
recent works produced in the last decade have challenged this approach by concentrating on 
alternative modes of political participation, especially by young people (O’Toole, Lister, & Marsch, 
2003; Ekman & Amnå, 2012; Soler-i-Martí, 2015; Ó Beacháin & Polese 2010; 2010b). This emerging body 
of scholarship has been concentrating on alternative forms of participation such as boycotting, 
political consumption, digital and networked participation, involvement in social movements and 
forums (Norris, 2004; Zukin, Keeter, Jenkins, & al., 2006; Dalton, 2011; Vromen, Xenos, & Loader, 
2014; Polese et al 2017). Although useful, these approaches have puzzled a number of scholars 
because they seemed to illustrate some decline of youth participation in formal, institutionalised 
politics (Patterson, 2002: Rossi, 2009) and thus classify young people as uninterested or apathetic 
(Rossi, 2009, p. 467), although accepted as a result of contemporary changes and considered 
alternative to institutionalized forms of political participation.
Kazakhstan is no exception in this respect. Often politics has not been considered beyond formal 
representation and the majority of works still employ a conventional framework for the concept of 
political participation. For one thing, the perception of youth political participation within the limits 
of institutional politics can be traced back to the National Report ‘The Youth of Kazakhstan-2013’ 
(Bukanova, Karimova, Ily’asova, Masatova, et al, 2013, p. 147), where four types of participation of 
the Kazakhstani youth are highlighted: 1) in state executive and representative bodies; 2) in political 
parties; 3) in public organisations and other formal associations; 3) in the implementation of their 
active and passive electoral right. The reasons for the conservative approach to citizens’ political 
participation and ignorance of new channels of engagement in Kazakhstan, firstly, lies in the fact 
that other forms of political participation, apart from traditional forms, are unknown and not 
investigated yet. Due to this research tendency in Kazakhstan, young people have been recognised 
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by researchers as indifferent to their nation’s political situation (Kalashnikova, 2008; Beisembayev, 
2009; Bukanova, Karimova, Ily’asova, Masatova, et al, 2013, p. 151; Chebotarev, 2014; Umbetaliyeva, 
2015), and concerns have appeared regarding the potential vulnerability and legitimacy of the 
present political system and civil society as a consequence of their disinterest. Among others, 
Kalashnikova (2008, p. 119) comes to the conclusion that the Kazakhstani youth demonstrate a 
low degree of involvement in the development of society, considering the inactiveness of the 
younger people in the prescheduled elections to Maslikhat in 2007 (a local representative body in 
the Republic of Kazakhstan). Although voting was considered the primary form for the people to 
affect the political system in the past, nowadays people have more options to influence political 
outcomes and protect their rights. We are inspired by this approach to suggest that an assessment 
of the level of political activity should go beyond voter turnout or other formal expression of political 
participation to look at the informal way participation in politics is produced and developed by 
a variety of actors that are not necessarily visible at a first glance (Isaacs and Polese 2016, Morris 
and Polese 2015, Pawlusz and Polese 2017). Scholars have given full attention to elections as an 
indicator of democratic developments or of the desire to participate in the production of the 
political (Ó Beacháin and Kevlihan 2015, Ó Beacháin 2012). This article is an effort to widen the 
understanding of political participation by looking, in addition to that, at alternative ways to 
engage with politics at the local and national level. 
Studies in Kazakhstan about political participation and the role of youth in the political process, 
although useful to provide a picture of formal participation, do not sufficiently acknowledge 
political participation of Kazakhstanis in non-formal processes, although a number of authors have 
emphasised the need for an increased formal-informal mixed approach (Isaacs 2011; 2015; Polese, 
2015). In line with this, the main point of this article is to suggest a re-focusing of scholarly debates 
on forms of political participation in Kazakhstan. We suggest that young people of Kazakhstan 
contribute to the development of the political in their country in a variety of ways that are not 
always taken into account, such as the internet and social networks. 
As a result, besides what can be seen as more traditional ways of engaging in politics, this article 
widens the sphere of action of potentially political actors and provides an extra focus on what 
we call the latent political participation of Kazakhstani youth. We suggest that young people 
might be taking an observing position, that is they might be getting ready to be more involved in 
political processes. This will be shown by highlighting the role of the internet in the formation of 
online political activism and everyday political discussions of the Kazakhstani youth. To do this, 
we observe multiple forms of political participation among the youth of Kazakhstan based on 
the typology proposed by Ekman and Amnå  (2012, p. 287): latent political participation (which 
manifests itself in social inclusion and civic engagement) and manifest political participation 
(expressed in terms of participation in formal politics and extra-parliamentary activity). We base 
our observation on the results of two surveys: Centre for Social and Political Studies ‘Strategy’ 
(Beisembayev, 2013) and the Research Institute ‘Public Opinion’ in cooperation with Friedrich 
Ebert Foundation (Umbetaliyeva, Rakisheva, & Teschendorf, 2016). 
Methodology
A number of studies have already highlighted the growing number of digital and networked 
political activity, political consumerism, as well as protests, in which the prominent role is 
played by the younger generation. This growing activity among young people in non-institutional 
forms of political participation has caused heated debate among scientists. Young people 
distancing themselves from traditional politics and its institutions are often seen as a part of 
the rapid transformation of the political landscape. As a result, traditional forms of ‘mandatory’ 
participation of citizens, such as voting and membership in political parties might be replaced by 
more personalised politics of self-realisation. The youth of today spend less time on participating 
in political parties, but they try new social movements and are active on the internet, as well as 
in transnational political networks instead (Ribeiro, Malafaia, Neves, & Menezes, 2015; Ó Beacháin 
& Polese, 2010). 
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The emergence of various forms of political participation among the new generation of young 
people can be explained by a change regarding the concept of politics itself.  The new view of 
politics is different from the more conventional approaches  (Soler-i-Martí, 2015, p. 400). For 
instance, Putnam (2000) and Worcestern &Pirie  (1998) interpreted the growing disengagement of 
young people from institutional politics as discontentment of young people with the governmental 
institutions and a general lack of interest in politics. However, Henn et al. (2007) and O’Toole et 
al. (2003) did not agree with the fact that young people lack interest in politics. However, they 
confirmed that young people’s dissociation from formal politics was a result of scepticism of the 
system’s functionality. Our approach in determining the political activity of the Kazakhstani youth 
follows Henn et al. (2007) and O’Toole et al. (2003), because we believe that young people do not 
distance themselves from politics, but rather from its institutional forms. Young people choose to 
operate ‘horizontally’ with their peers, rather than to work within a hierarchical structure, as their 
social circle is their source of information and support (Soler-i-Martí, 2015, p. 82). Inglehart (1990) 
thinks that protest is a form of non-institutional political participation that allows for richer forms 
of individual self-expression than voting or mere membership in political parties.  
Several studies argue that younger generations are more focused on an individualist and 
consumerist lifestyle compared to previous generations, showing their passive interest in political 
events and processes (Andolina, Jenkins, Keeter, & Zukin, 2002; Perliger, Canetti-Nisim, & Pedahzur, 
2006; Stolle, Hooghe, & Micheletti, 2005). The reasons for the changes in the political behaviour 
of younger people might, in fact, be due to such factors as the emergence of new attractive forms 
of political participation, as well as a rising distrust regarding the authorities and their inability to 
influence political events, i.e. political efficacy.
For this study and in line with the official definition of the country, people ranging from 14 to 
29 years old are considered to be young people (Nazarbayev, 2015)  that make up 27% of the 
whole country’s population. We survey their attitudes by using two sets of data. First, the results 
of the sociological surveys made by the Public Fund Centre for Social and Political Studies 
‘Strategy’ (Beisembayev, 2013) and, second, the Research Institute ‘Public Opinion’ together with 
the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (Umbetaliyeva, Rakisheva, & Teschendorf, 2016). The Centre for 
Social and Political Studies ‘Strategy’ conducted a study in 2010 and 2013 in 14 regions (oblasts) 
of Kazakhstan, as well as in the cities Almaty and Astana. The total number of respondents was 
453, aged from 18 to 29. The selection of the respondents was carried out through a random route 
technique and quota sampling.
The Research Institute ‘Public Opinion’ and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation conducted a study on 
Kazakhstani youth, similar to the famous Shell Youth Study, carried out regularly with an interval 
of 3-4 years in Germany. The total number of respondents was 1000, aged from 14 to 29 years in the 
14 regions of Kazakhstan, as well as in the cities Astana and Almaty. The selection of respondents 
was also carried out using a random route technique and quota sampling. The survey was carried 
out in the period from December 27, 2014, to January 15, 2015. The socio-demographic composition 
of respondents corresponds to the general structure of the youth: 49.9% were females and 50.1% 
males; 63.7% said that they belong to the Kazakh identity, 30.8% to the Russian identity. Regardless 
of age, the respondents are evenly distributed: the representatives of each age category were 5% 
or more. The division of the younger people consist of three category groups: 35.4% aged 14 to 19; 
31.6% aged 20 to 24 and 33% aged 25 to 29 years old. The survey covers both the urban and the 
rural population and was conducted through face-to-face interviews. 
There are some methodological shortcomings in both surveys. The Centre for Social and Political 
Studies ‘Strategy’ and the Research Institute ‘Public Opinion’ with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation 
use a small sample size of youth (453 and 1000 young people) for researching a big country. 
However, the size of the sample is one of the largest so far in a country-based research study, it 
provides a good balance between urban and rural areas and also contributes toward making us 
appreciate the differences between cities and regions in the country. 
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Demography and political participation
Geography matters, it is possible that political views of Almaty’s youth are different from 
Astana’s youth because working youth in Astana are mostly represented in the structures of the 
government. Astana’s young people are mostly involved in institutional politics, while the youth in 
Almaty is working in different international organisations, companies, and NGOs. They are more 
likely to have non-institutional political orientations. Astana youth, comprising 199 294 people 
from 14 to 28 years old (Ministry of National Economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan Comittee on 
Statistics), including high school pupils, students and working youth, have the opportunity to be 
actively involved in different celebratory flash mobs, and volunteer in republican events since their 
celebrations mostly take place in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan. The majority of Almaty’s youth 
participated as volunteers in Aziada 2011, OSCE forum, Universiade 2017, and other volunteering 
programs.
445 986 people from 14 to 28 years old represent Almaty youth (Ministry of National Economy of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan Comittee on Statistics). Almaty is the most attractive city for students in 
Kazakhstan, since there are 38 higher educational institutions and around 200,000 students in the 
city (Zakon.kz, 2014). Also, for the last five years Almaty has taken the leading place in the Unified 
National Testing (Graduate assessment system in Kazakhstan). Students with top scores from the 
Unified National Testing come from all regions of Kazakhstan to study in Almaty because of a wide 
range of higher educational institutions (and a large number of grants and scholarships). Students 
come to Astana for the recently established international Nazarbayev University. Students who 
did not obtain grants still choose to pursue higher studies in Almaty or Astana, if their parents are 
able to afford education and living expenses. The majority of university graduates do not return 
home but prefer to stay in Almaty to pursue further career goals. Almaty is an attractive option for 
them due to its mild climate, developed infrastructure and social life scene. By contrast, Astana is 
attractive due to career opportunities in government structures. 
Compared to youth from other oblasts, young people from the Atyrau, Mangystau and Kyzyl-Orda 
oblasts stand out by having the highest civic activity and desire to engage in politics (Analitical 
group ‘Kipr’, 2015). According to Umbetaliyeva (2017), this is due to the specific social and political 
atmosphere in these regions, where people demonstrated their opposition since the mid-1990s. 
This environment and socio-political sentiments influence young people who grow up in these 
regions. Thus, they show ideas and views similar to their parents. 
The Ministry of National Economy reports that in 2013 the number of Kazakhstani youth was 
4 656 500 people; 2 574 100 of them lived in urban areas, and 2 082 400 young people in rural areas 
(Ministry of National Economy of the Republic of Kazakhstan Comittee on Statistics). The class 
and gender difference of Kazakhstani youth is innate to the urban/rural dichotomy. In cities, youth 
enjoy a higher social status and women are more active. Young people who grew up in Almaty 
or Astana have better social opportunities compared to youth from other regions or rural places. 
In rural areas – an environment dominated by traditions – youth come from lower social and 
economic strata and women are largely less active. Generally, youth who live in the rural places 
have a lower level of political activity compared to youth in cities. Problems such as unemployment, 
low salaries, undeveloped healthcare, and inadequate educational facilities in addition to flawed 
informational services in rural places force young people to move to cities to search for better 
conditions and a higher income. Internal migration from rural places to cities more likely leads 
to an increase of poverty-stricken people in a city than to the fulfilment of migrants’ aspirations. 
Thus, in cities, specifically in Almaty, there is a large number of socially disadvantaged marginalised 
youth. A lower level of academic and professional attainment among rural youth results in lower 
income, unstable employment and earnings outside of the official labour market (or joblessness) 
in contrast with urban youth. The frustration caused by these factors/life chances and social 
stratification results in greater social cleavages between urban and rural citizens, as well as to 
a growth of social tension and an increased rate of reported crime. Nonetheless, typically young 
people in Kazakhstan are united by their problems of unemployment, low salaries and a lack of 
housing. Still, socio-economic reasons have not pushed young Kazakhstanis to demand better 
social conditions from the government. There are some measures of government support: youth 
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employment centres; the project ‘Zhilstroisberbank’ (that provides mortgage for housing); the 
program ‘S diplomom - v selo!’ – ‘To the village with a diploma!’ (the provision of social benefits 
for young specialists working in villages), and many others. 
Given these socio-economic factors, the authors analyse the political participation of Kazakhstani 
youth in two ways: traditional forms of political participation and new ones. In traditional 
participation, the paper gives an evaluation of youth activities in manifest political participation: 
formal and extra-parliamentary. Under new forms of political participation, the paper examines 
youth latent and online-based engagement among the youth.
Manifest Political Participation
Manifest political behaviour is actual political participation, i.e. all actions of citizens, aiming 
to influence the governmental decisions and political outcomes in a society. These actions are 
obvious, observable and can be measured straightforwardly (Ekman & Amnå, 2012). In the category 
of ‘manifest political participation’, Ekman and Amnå (2012, p 289) differentiated between formal 
and extra-parliamentary political participation . To the formal political participation, they grouped 
activities such as electoral participation; contacting public officials; membership in political parties, 
organisations, and trade unions. The extra-parliamentary forms of political participation are 
divided into legal (demonstrations, strikes, protests, etc.) and illegal types (violent activities and 
protests). 
To understand the Kazakhstani citizens’ manifest political participation, we will briefly describe 
the political system of Kazakhstan. The Republic of Kazakhstan is a unitary presidential republic. 
The executive power is exercised by the government (Pravitel’stvo). The Parliament has two 
chambers. The Lower House is Majilis, which has 107 seats (98 seats are from party lists, 9 from the 
Assembly of People). All members of Parliament are elected for a five-year term. The Upper House 
Senate has 47 members, 40 of them are elected for a six-year term in double-seat constituencies 
by the local assemblies, half are up for re-election every two years, and there are 7 presidential 
nominees. According to the Constitution of Kazakhstan, a citizen who has reached the age of 25 
can become a Deputy of the Majilis. A citizen who has reached 30 can become a Senate Deputy. 
A Deputy of Maslikhat, a local representative body, can be a citizen of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
who has reached 20 years of age (The Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2016). Despite 
the lower age requirement for a candidacy in Maslikhat and Majilis, the representation of 
Kazakhstani youth in governance is low. “At the local level in Maslikhat the representation of 
the youth (under 30 years of age) is only 3.9%, while representation in the legislative branch 
called Majilis is at 0%” (Dukeyev, 2015). The opportunities to be engaged in governance and in 
decision-making processes for the Kazakhstani youth are strained by a political culture that is 
built by a hierarchical structure in formal organisations that function on a principle of seniority 
and value experience. It is considered that youth need to go through a period of time in order to 
have an opportunity to be engaged in governance and in the decision-making process, or in other 
words the age qualification. The youth’s lack of work/life experience and connections are the main 
reasons why youth representation in governance is low.
The national report ‘The Youth of Kazakhstan - 2014’ (Ministry of Education of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, 2015) showed in numbers the quantity of young governmental workers. In 2014, 
there were 22,306 young civil servants under 30 years of age in Kazakhstan; 22,304 of them were 
administrative workers and only 2 of them were political employees. The representation of youth in 
the Parliament was 13,104 people. However, 13,103 of them were administrative workers and only 1 
of them was a political employee (Bukanova, Karimova, Amreeva, & Zainiyeva, 2014, p. 155). As it can 
be seen from these data, the numbers of young people working in the government of Kazakhstan 
are high; however, all of them are involved in administrative work, not political. Consequently, 
youth are almost excluded from the processes of real participation in the government. 
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Voter turnout
The most popular and common form of political participation in Kazakhstan is voting in elections. 
The lowest voting turnout in the elections of Kazakhstan is observed in Maslikhats; an average 
voting turnout is observed in the elections to the Majilis, and the highest voting turnout takes 
place in the presidential elections (Ileuova, 2014). 
The Research Public Foundation ‘Strategy’ demonstrates that the adult population is more active 
in voter turnout that the young generation (see Figure 4) (Beisembayev, 2013). Citizens aged 30-
45 and 46-60 years old display similar figures with 84% compared to 85% electoral activity. The 
most active voter turnout is observed among Kazakhstani pensioners – 91%. Compared to other 
age groups in Kazakhstan, the youth, aged 18-29 years old, exhibit an electoral activity of 69% (see 
Table 1), making them the least active age group. Nevertheless, all age groups represent high levels 
of electoral participation. Table 1 shows that other traditional forms of political participation are 
unpopular among Kazakhstanis: 7% of the population as a whole appeal to the representatives 
of authorities and only 3% work in a political party or for a deputy candidate to partake in the 
pre-election process, while in contrast 80% of the population participates in voting. However, 
citizens’ turnout in the elections is not indicative of their political activity or overall support for 
the traditional forms of political participation, rather it is a sense of civic duty to the state that 
has been instilled in local culture since the days of the Soviet Union. “In fact, citizens have no 
personal interest in the candidate selection process and do not believe that their vote matter” 
(Ileuova, 2014). 
Table 1. Answer to the question ‘In which of the listed activities have you ever personally 
participated?’ (2013)
18-29 y.o. 30-45 y.o. 46-60 y.o.
61 y.o.and 
over
The population as a 
whole
Voting in elections 69% 84% 85% 91% 80%
Appealing to the rep-
resentatives of gov-
ernment bodies 
6% 5% 8% 10% 7%
Working in a political 
party or for a deputy 
candidate 
3% 4% 4% 1% 3%
Source: Centre for Social and Political Studies ‘Strategy’ (2013)
Detailed information about the different degree of intensity in electoral participation among 
youth is available in another sociological poll (Umbetaliyeva, Rakisheva, & Teschendorf, 2016, p. 
151), which shows that 48.50% of the youth, aged from 14 to 29 years old, had the experience 
of participating in the elections (see Figure 1), clarifying that 9.9% of them participate in every 
possible election; 10.10% of young people participate in most of the elections. Consequently, 20% 
of the Kazakhstani youth demonstrates a high level of electoral activity. A slightly larger number - 
28.5% of the Kazakhstani youth vote only occasionally. Those who did not vote, because they had 
not reached the age of 18 (the age at which youth are allowed to vote in Kazakhstan) made up 
17.20%. Almost one third of the younger people (29.70%), who had reached 18, the age for being 
allowed to participate in the elections, did not take part in voting. 
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Figure 1: Answer to the question ‘How often have you voted since you are legally allowed to?’
Answer Options Percent
In all elections 9,9
In most of the elections 10,1
In some elections 28,5
Never 29,7
Below the voting age 17,2
No answer 4,6
In total 100
9.9
10.1
28.5
29.7
17.2
4.6
100
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
In	all	elections	
In	most	of	the	elections
In	some	elections
Never
Below	the	voting	age
No	answer
In	total
Source: Research Institute ‘Public Opinion’ and Friedrich Ebert Foundation (2016)
Why do a third of Kazakhstani youth not participate in the elections, and why do 28.5% of another 
group of youth vote only occasionally? Kaletayev (2003, p. 83) explained this trend of declining interest 
among citizens regarding the elections of representative bodies by a low trust level concerning the 
voting system among the population. According to Umbetaliyeva et.al (2016, p. 61), the greatest 
trust of young people, aged 14 to 29 years old, is in the President of Kazakhstan N.Nazarbayev 
(64.60%). 43.60% of the youth fully trust the Parliament; 45.8% trust the Pravitel’stvo (Ministers), 
and 30.4% trust local authorities/the akim (mayor). The Kazakhstani youth demonstrate a low 
level of trust in the political parties, the police, the courts and others showed in the table below 
(see Figure 2).
Figure 2: Answer to the question ‘How much do you trust the organisations listed below’? 
Answer Options Fully Trust Trust Small trustDo not TrustDo not know
Parliament 43,6 36,5 13,5 4,3 2,1
President 64,6 21 10,2 2,1 1,7
Government 45,8 35,6 12,6 4,2 1,8
Local Authorities 30,4 40 20,7 6,6 2,3
Political Parties 24 40,5 22 10,4 3,1
Police 20,4 40,7 24,1 12,2 2,6
Army 31,2 32,4 22,1 10,9 3,4
Courts 21,4 37,9 25,4 11,4 3,9
CSTO 18,3 39,6 7,5 8,8 9,1
EAEU 20,3 42,5 21,8 7,5 7,9
Religious Leaders 14 34,8 26,4 16,3 8,5
Media 15,2 43,5 26,6 9,1 5,6
Trade Unions 13,3 34,6 26 14,9 11,2
NGOs 12 32,4 27,2 14,7 13,7
Banks 11,5 33,6 31,2 15 8,7
Shangai Cooperation 12,5 34,4 25,6 11,6 15,9 43.6
64.6
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31.2
21.4 18.3 20.3 14 15.2 13.3 12 11.5 12.5
36.5
21
35.6
40
40.5
40.7
32.4
37.9 39.6
42.5
34.8
43.5
34.6 32.4 33.6 34.4
13.5
10.2 12.6
20.7
22 24.1 22.1 25.4
7.5
21.8
26.4
26.6
26 27.2 31.2 25.6
4.3 2.1 4.2 6.6 10.4 12.2 10.9 11.4
8.8
7.5
16.3
9.1
14.9 14.7
15
11.6
2.1 1.7 1.8 2.3 3.1 2.6 3.4 3.9
9.1
7.9 8.5 5.6 11.2 13.7 8.7 15.9
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Parliament Government Political	Parties Army CSTO Religious	
Leaders
Trade	Unions Banks
How	much	do	you	trust	the	organizations	listed	below?	
Do	not	know Do	not	Trust Small	trust Trust Fully	Trust
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Most other frequent reasons are explained by the lack of efficacy – the youth do not believe that 
their voice will be heard (Beisembayev, 2014), as well as the fact that many young people are not 
familiar with candidates and their electoral campaign. Another common reason for not voting 
is the lack of a propiska, i.e. legal registration of residency, which makes it impossible vote. This 
Shugyla Kilybayeva, Gulnar Nassimova, Aliya Massalimova60
mainly affects migrant workers and students in the major cities, who frequently rent their living 
accommodations, instead of owning their own housing. Moreover, not voting could be viewed 
according to Ekman and Amnå  (2012, p. 287) as a protest act, considering the deliberate act of not 
voting as political participation. 
Participation in Political Parties
As it was mentioned above, compared to the electoral participation, the younger generation of 
Kazakhstan shows little interest and activity in political parties same as adult population. Only 
5.80% of young people from the entire youth population in Kazakhstan are members of political 
parties (Bukanova & Masatova, 2014). According to the Centre for Social and Political Studies 
‘Strategy’, just 3% of the youth work in a political party or for a deputy candidate to partake in the 
pre-election process (see Table 1). However, according to the poll (see Figure 3), 23.1% of the youth 
will choose to participate in the activities of political parties as a way to influence authorities 
(Beisembayev, 2013).
The most popular party in Kazakhstan is the president-led party Nur Otan. Its youth wing the Zhas 
Otan alone has more than 200,000 members (Bukanova, Karimova, Ily’asova, Masatova, et al 2013, 
p. 149). The other eight officially registered parties of Kazakhstan do not have data on the number 
of younger members, though the National Social Democratic Party (OSDP) and Communist People’s 
Party of Kazakhstan (KNPK) also have youth wings (Satpayev, et al., 2014).  
The younger people’s low interest in political parties has been explained in many ways by several 
experts on Kazakhstan. One of the reasons is that the activities of political parties do not comply 
with the new political reality. Political parties are not able to respond to different requirements 
and needs of the population ( Ministry of Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2015, p. 114). 
Zhunusova (2013) believes that the youth branches of political parties are empty since the younger 
generation has no desire to be involved in the party because of the limitations in the process of 
political decision-making.  “Low interest among youth in the activities of political parties is caused 
by the fact that parties in Kazakhstan have not been active in the ongoing work, only being active 
during participation in various election campaigns” (Satpayev, et al., 2014, p. 180).
Participation in Youth Organisations
In 2014, there were 1081 youth organisations in the republic of Kazakhstan ( Ministry of Education 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2015, p. 114). The majority of Kazakhstani youth do not participate 
in the activities of these youth organisations; young people are even rarely familiar with their 
names (Beisembayev, 2009). 
Data from the research centre ‘Molodezh’ ( Bukanova, Karimova, Amreeva, , & Zainiyeva, 2013, 
p. 12) showed the most popular youth organisations and their figures are as follows: 74.90% of 
young people in Kazakhstan are familiar with Association of Bolashak, 64.90% with Zhas Otan, 
59.30% with Zhasyl El, 57.60% with Zhas Ulan, and 47.60% with Youth Congress of Kazakhstan. 
Other youth organisations such as Zhas Kyran, National Volunteer Network, Student construction 
labour groups, Rural Youth Unions, Young Deputies Association, and Working Youth Union, etc., 
are unknown to most young people.
The reasons why the Kazakhstani youth avoid activities in youth organisations are explained by 
several political scientists and researchers. First of all, ‘youth organizations weakly interact with 
both the young people themselves, and with the state’ (Eshpanova, Narbekova, & Biyekenova, 
2014, p. 41). Secondly, youth movements and associations do not have the resources for large-scale 
deployment of their activities because of a lack of financial resources and administrative tools 
(Kaletayev, 2003, p. 74). Several Kazakhstani experts (Satpayev, et al., 2014, p. 113) claim that youth 
organisations are not able to efficiently hand over political socialisation.
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Contact activities
In order to be heard by the authorities or to protect their own rights, Kazakhstani citizens contact 
political representatives or civil servants. According to data, only 6% of youth appealed to their 
political representatives (see Table 1, Figure 5).  However, 38.1% of youth consider that appealing 
to the media is the most effective way to influence power, and 8.2% prefer use personal contacts 
(see Figure 3) (Beisembayev, 2013). Also, lately it is common that Kazakhstani people use Facebook 
and other social networks for appealing to the people with their problems. 
Extra-parliamentary participation 
To begin with, the political environment and laws of Kazakhstan restrict the participation of their 
citizens in rallies and demonstrations. According to special Rapporteur M. Kiai, who undertook 
an official mission to the Republic of Kazakhstan (in January 19-27, 2015), ‘the possibility of 
appropriately exercising the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and freedom of association in 
Kazakhstan is not provided to everyone’ (United Nations Special Rapporteur, 2015). Also, the Human 
Rights Watch reported that law enforcement officers forcefully suppressed peaceful protests in 
Kazakhstan (Gearry, 2016). According to certain experts, the fact that dissent is not tolerated, and 
there are suppressions and punishments for peaceful demonstrations in Kazakhstan, is evidence of 
the fact that elements of ‘sovietness’ (sovetskost’) in political regime still prevail ( Friedrich Ebert 
Foundation, 2015; BBC News, 2016). These limitations in allowing outlets for peaceful dissent and 
political pluralism (Adilet.kz, 2015) are partially transferred from the old Soviet regime. For 70 years 
the people were under the control of Soviet authorities and it was forbidden to engage in politics. 
Those who showed dissent became enemies of the people (‘vrag naroda’). The memory of Soviet 
repressions is still fresh, so the fear of being punished, which leads to self-censorship, still persists 
in the minds of adults (who grew up in Soviet times) and the younger generation.
Concerning the data on how many Kazakhstani youth (as well as adults) participate in extra-
parliamentary political participation (2013), the researchers of the Public Fund ‘Strategy’ 
revealed a very low level of participation (see Figure 3). They distinguished several types of extra-
parliamentary engagement: sanctioned (legal) rallies and demonstrations; signing appeals; strikes, 
pickets; unsanctioned (illegal) rallies (Beisembayev, 2013). 
Figure 3: The forms of youth political participation in Kazakhstan
Electoral participation 69%
Contacting political representatives 6%
Work in a political party 3%
Participation in sanctioned rallies and demonstrations1%
Signing appeals and letters to media 1%
Participation in strikes and pickets 0%
Activity in illegal rallies (unsanctioned) 0%
None of the listed answers 29%
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62.3% of Kazakhstani youth believe that they are not able to influence political power, i.e. have 
a low level of political efficacy (see Figure 4) (Beisembayev, 2013). Those young people who 
believe that they can influence political decisions make up 27.8%, and they prefer the following 
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mechanisms of influence: electoral participation (47.8%), contacting media (38.1%), participation 
in political parties (23.1%), participation in strikes and rallies (20.9%), participation in public 
organisations (16.4%), applying to courts (15.7%), participation in trade unions (11.2%), using 
independent personal contacts (8.2%), acts of civil disobedience (7.5%), participation in hunger 
strikes (4.5%) (see Figure 4).
Figure 4: Answer to the question ‘What do you consider the most effective way to influence power?’
Electoral participation 47,8
Contacting the Media 38,1
Participation in political
parties 23,1
Participation in strikes and rallies 20,9
Participation in public organizations16,4
Appeal to courts 15,7
Participation in trade unions 11,2
Using independent personal contacts8,2
Acts of civil disobedience 7,5
Participation in hunger strikes 4,5
Difficult to answer 4,5
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Source: Centre for Social and Political Studies ‘Strategy’ (2013)
Despite the fact that a considerable number of young people choose the extra-parliamentary way of 
influencing the authorities (20.9% of youth suggest the most effective way to influence the government 
is to participate in strikes and demonstrations, 7.5% in acts of civil disobedience and 4.5% in hunger 
strikes) (see Figure 4),  it is notable that only 1% of youth had been involved in a real situation with 
sanctioned rallies and another 1% of youth participated in the signing of petitions (see Figure 3) 
(Beisembayev, 2013). None of the respondents, according to their statements, took part in unsanctioned 
strikes, pickets, or illegal rallies (see Figure 3). Nonetheless, 8% of young people are ready to participate 
in a mass acts of protest, and 25% will make a decision depending on the circumstances (see Figure 
5) (Umbetaliyeva, Rakisheva, & Teschendorf, 2016). According to Nassimova (2012, p. 104), there are no 
political forces in Kazakhstan that facilitate the consolidation of the youth protest movements. Thus, 
the level of youth protest activity in Kazakhstan is not high, but the potential exists. 
Figure 5: Answer to the question ‘If mass protests occur in the near future, will you partake?’
18-29 General population
Yes 8 7
I will make a decision depending on the circumstances 25 23
No, in not in any case 56 60
Undecided 10 11
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Source: Research Institute ‘Public Opinion’ and Friedrich Ebert Foundation (2016)
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The top three possible reasons for mass protests in Kazakhstan, forecast by youth in a 2013 social 
poll, were problems of economic nature: high prices for food, goods, and utilities (29%), low 
incomes, wages, and pensions (26%), unemployment (23%), etc. (see Table 2). 
Table 2: The list of problems that may cause protest performances of young citizens
Youth aged 18-29 
year old
Low incomes, wages, pensions, etc. 26%
High prices for food products, utility services 23%
Unemployment, the inability to find a good job 29%
Corruption in the government 15%
Land and housing issues (housing demolition, shared construc-
tion, etc.)
10%
The high cost of housing (purchase, lease) 11%
Ecological problems 8%
Closing of the employer (enterprise, market, etc.) 10%
Discrimination based on ethnic, linguistic grounds 11%
Violation of human rights and freedoms, the lack of democracy 6%
Education and health problems 8%
Irresponsibility and efficiency of local authorities 5%
Failures in the implementation of government social programs 2%
Irremovability of the supreme power in the country 4%
Difficulties of doing business, economic problems 3%
The loss of sovereignty as a result of integration through the es-
tablishment of the Customs Union
1%
Others 1%
None of the problems 13%
Difficult to answer 20%
Source: Centre for Social and Political Studies ‘Strategy’ (2013)
Indeed, over the past quarter century, Kazakhstani citizens, unlike people of other post-Soviet 
republics (Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Georgia) have avoided mass public protests. Kazakhstan has a 
reputation of relative staidness (Casey, 2016). Nevertheless, there were some locally occurring 
protests as a result of growing discontent among the population because of social inequality, 
declining living standards, etc. For instance, in December 2011 there were local protests in 
Zhanaozen (Western Kazakhstan), where oil workers demanded better pay (Putz, 2011). In 
February, 2014, there was an anti-devaluation youth protest in Almaty (Lillis, 2014). In April – May, 
2016, protests over proposed land reforms spread across the country in several cities such as 
Atyrau, Aktobe, Aktau, Zhanaozen, Semey, Kyzyl Orda, and Almaty, etc., which is unprecedented in 
Kazakhstan. The reason – the people disagreed with the changes in the law that allows foreigners 
to rent agricultural land in Kazakhstan for 25 years (BBC News, 2016). 
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Despite the fact that rallies and demonstrations are perceived by the law as unconventional and 
unsanctioned (not officially permitted) (RadioFreeEurope RadioLiberty, 2016; Reuters, 2016), they do 
happen and are the last resort for citizens to show their disagreement and resentment. Therefore, 
the authors correlated the rallies and protests in Kazakhstan not with unconventional, but rather 
with extra-parliamentary activities because they are an alternative to institutionalised forms of 
political participation and occurred numerous times in the history of the Kazakhs. For example, 
the liberation struggle of the Kazakh people against foreign conquerors; uprisings against policies 
of the Russian Empire; etc.; December 1986 mass youth protests against communist authority; 
local protests in Zhanaozen (Western Kazakhstan) and April-May 2016 protests over proposed land 
reforms and the fear of loss of sovereignty. The last one demonstrated that there was a possibility 
for mass mobilisation and social movements in Kazakhstan. In order to mitigate the protest 
temper of the population, the authorities were forced to place a moratorium on land reform and 
create a special committee on this issue (Toktomushev, 2016). Thus, political participation such as 
mass protests have a positive influence (for the people) on the government’s decisions. 
Latent political participation 
Research on political participation has focused primarily on manifested and observable actions 
or activities of citizens that in some way are directed toward influencing political outcomes in 
society. Ekman and Amnå (2012, p. 288)  introduced a wider concept of political participation by 
adding latent political participation. According to them “latent political participation is the kind 
of engagement that may be regarded ‘pre-political’ or on ‘stand-by’. This notion of latency is 
based on the simple observation that citizens actually do a lot of things that may not be directly 
or unequivocally classified as ‘political participation’, but at the same time could be of great 
significance for future political activities of a more conventional type…” (ibid.)
People of all ages engage socially in a number of ways that may have political consequences. 
Hence, behind their actions there is a certain amount of latent political participation. Ekman 
and  Amnå (2012) define latent political participation as including the following characteristics: 
interest in and attention to politics; the perception of politics as something important; reading 
and watching the news; discussing political issues with family and friends; belonging to a 
group or team, specialising in politics. Moreover, civic engagement has traces of latent political 
participation. Volunteering for social or community-based organisations, charities and the like 
may be a precursor of future political activity.
Let us investigate, whether the Kazakhstani youth have components of latent political participation.
According to the questionnaire survey conducted by the Public Fund ‘Strategy’ (2013), the number 
of young people who are interested in politics is cautiously, yet indisputably growing. In 2010, 77% 
of the people asked responded that they were interested in politics (constantly and occasionally). 
In 2013, the number increased to 79% (see Figure 6). 20% of the Kazakhstani youth responded that 
they are interested in politics on a regular basis (2010), and 57% of young people are interested in 
politics from time to time. These numbers have changed slightly in 2013: regular interest in politics 
has increased by 3%, and those who are interested in politics from time to time have decreased by 
1%. The youth who are indifferent to the political events were 22% in 2010 and 19% in 2013.
Figure 6: Answer to the question ‘Are You Interested in the Political Events of Kazakhstan?’ 
General	population	 Youth	in	2013 Youth	in	2010
Regularly	interested 29 23 20
Interested	occasionally 52 56 57
Practically	not	interested 17 19 22
Difficult	to	answer 2 2 1
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Difficult	to	answer
Youth	in	2010
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Source: Centre for Social and Political Studies ‘Strategy’ (2013)
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As we have seen, 79% of the Kazakhstani youth is interested in politics habitually and occasionally. 
‘Viewing and reading the news’ means information consumed through television, streaming or 
browsing the news on the internet, social networking websites, message boards, blogs, radio 
broadcasting, newspapers and magazines. Discussions with relatives and friends also occur, but 
they are not particularly commonplace among the younger people (see Figure 7).
Figure 7: Answer to the question ‘What is your main source for information regarding political news?’ 
18-23 Years Old24-29 Years old
Television 76 77
Internet News sites 32 29
Forums and social media 24 20
Newspapers 15 17
Discussion with friends 10 9
Radio 3 4
Difficult to answer 1 1
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36.40% of Kazakhstani youth believe that it is important to engage in politics. Another 44.10% of 
young people support the view that civic engagement is important (Umbetaliyeva, Rakisheva, 
& Teschendorf, 2016, p. 145). 9.30% of the young people do volunteer work. The main reason for 
volunteering according to a half of the respondents is a desire to be involved in society. 60% of the 
Kazakhstani youth wish to participate in the development of the country (ibid).
Therefore, we can see that a certain part of the Kazakhstani youth is involved in latent forms of 
participation, namely: interest in politics, political discussions with family and friends, following 
political news; presence of the feeling that politics is something important; volunteering in 
different sporting events (Aziada-2011, Universiade-2017), as well as in the form of assistance and 
support for vulnerable and disadvantaged people, in cleaning public places and planting in green 
spaces, etc. (see Table 2).
Table 3. Characteristics of latent political participation
The young people’s interest and 
attention regarding politics
79% of young people, aged 18-29 years old (23% of 
them are interested in politics regularly; 56% occa-
sionally)
Youth is of the opinion that pol-
itics is important
36.40% of the younger population aged 14-29 years 
old.
Reads and watches the news 79% of the younger population aged 14-29 years old.
Discusses political issues with 
family and friends 9.50% of the younger population, aged 18-29.
Civic participation (volunteer-
ing, charity, etc.) 9.30% of the younger population, aged 14-29.
Source: Centre for Social and Political Studies ‘Strategy’ (2013) & Research Institute ‘Public Opinion’ 
and Friedrich Ebert Foundation (2016)
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Youth online participation in Kazakhstan
The modern youth spend less of their political energy on participating in institutional politics, but 
more on trying out new forms of political participation, mainly through the use of the internet 
(Vromen, Xenos, & Loader, 2014). The Kazakh online community is growing very fast. According to 
World statistics on the internet, in December 2014 there were 9 966 444 internet users registered 
in Kazakhstan, accounting for a 54.3% of the total population (Internet World Stats, 2016). By 
comparison, in 2005 there were 400 000 internet users, that is 2.7% of the total population. 3.3 
million people are actively using social networks every day. The most popular social network in 
Kazakhstan with 1 000 954 users (the vast majority are young people up to 18 years) is Vkontakte. 
Instagram is the second most popular social network, with more than 1 000 136 of users. Facebook 
is actively used by 125,800 Kazakhstani people, whereas 20% of them are youth, aged 18-24, and 
45.4% are aged 26-34 (TengriNews, 2016).
The use of social media by young people for the purpose of political participation is a growing 
area of  research around the world. Research has shown that social networks are a tool for group 
organisation, and platforms for the exchange of alternative political ideas among the youth. By 
using social media, youth are following public and political news, promoting or ‘liking’ (which also 
means ‘agree’ with the opinion), and writing arguments (in comments and posts) with respect 
to some socio-political problems. Thus, in virtue of the internet in Kazakhstan, social networks 
represent an opportunity for everyday conversation and discussion of socio-political problems. 
Therefore, it is no longer a necessity to officially join a traditional political organisation, which 
limits personal self-expression. Moreover, the Kazakhstani youth, who refrain from engagement 
in conventional adult-oriented politics because of its hierarchical, paternalistic and seniority-
based system, choose to be active ‘horizontally’ with their peers, have their own ‘rules’ and 
richer opportunities for self-realisation. Such behaviour among the youth might be explained by 
the spread of an individualist and consumerist lifestyle and the tools that new technologies can 
suggest.
Kazakhstani youth actively monitor the posts of famous politicians, political scientists, experts 
and public figures on Facebook and Instagram. For instance, a popular political expert Dosym 
Satpayev has more than 20 000 followers on Facebook. However, Facebook and other social media 
outlets do not substitute meetings and events for groups of people, so many Kazakhstani people 
use Facebook to get information about offline meetings such as the content of the event, the 
location, time and approximate number of visitors. It should be noted that many organisations 
and newspapers also adapt their approaches to the circulation of information, recruitment and 
mobilisation in the digital age. However, the lack of security mechanisms on the internet can 
lead to many threats, such as the involvement of youth in radical extremist and suicide-oriented 
organisations, being deceived by fraudsters, etc.
Kazakhstani youth do not want to take part in institutional politics because dissent is not welcome 
there, so the alternative is social networks, which serve as a kind of channel for expressing their 
disagreement and resentment. On social networks, the youth are exposed to the posts of experts 
who do not support the policy of the state and who criticise the government. Moreover, Kazakhstani 
youth, unlike the adult population, are more advanced in English and are able to read English 
language mass media, which offers an alternative view on political issues. Through the expression 
of opinion, discussion of politics and interaction with like-minded people in creating initiatives 
via social networks, online political participation and latent participation can transform to active 
manifest political participation. The majority of youth, as well as the adult population, used the 
internet as their main source of information (international media, YouTube, social networks such 
as Facebook and communication applications such as WhatsApp) during the protest in May 2016, 
and continue using it nowadays. 
In January 2017, Kazakhstan’s President N. Nazarbayev during a special televised address to 
the nation proposed a number of amendments to the Constitution, which were submitted to 
nationwide discussions. Widespread disputes arose around the first paragraph of Article 26 which 
states, ‘Citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan may privately own any legally acquired property’ 
(Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 1995). In turn, the drafters of the bill propose to replace 
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the words ‘citizens of Kazakhstan’ with the word ‘everyone’. This caused a negative reaction among 
the people, who expressed their disagreement mostly on social networks such as Facebook. The 
government was under pressure to agree with the opinion of its citizens to not to alter Article 
26 of the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Thus, online political participation of the 
Kazakhstani people has had an overall positive effect on the political system: the government 
started to react, interact and take into account the people’s opinion.
Conclusion 
This article does not aim to encourage young people of Kazakhstan to participate in non-
institutionalised and illegal forms of political participation. Instead, the authors emphasise the 
fact that in Kazakhstan political participation is not recognised beyond formal representation 
and highlight the need for closer scrutiny of all forms of political participation, especially among 
the youth, since they are common users of digital technologies and the internet. Ignoring online 
youth engagement and other non-institutionalised forms of participation may cause negative and 
destructive consequences for the government and society. Moreover, there is a need to reveal the 
latent political participation among the youth and cease regarding them as an apathetic group, 
but rather as potentially active members of the political process. 
In the analysis of different types of youth political participation in Kazakhstan, the authors conclude 
that the Kazakhstani youth is alienated from institutionalised politics in general. They are just not 
comfortable with mandatory adult-oriented policy, where political culture is built according to 
a hierarchy and the principle of seniority. A lack of political efficacy in institutionalised politics, 
as well as a dislike of mandatory and hierarchical politics, led the Kazakhstani youth to refrain 
from more active participation in traditional political processes. Voting remains the most popular 
form of traditional political participation among citizens of Kazakhstan but it is not meaningful, 
as it is not real participation due to its mandatory and disciplinary character. By contrast, online 
activism of young people in Kazakhstan represents an interesting platform for information, 
communication, exchange of opinions, and event involvement not only for personal purposes but 
also for socio-political talks. The authors highlight the role of the internet and social networks 
in the formation of youth political participation in Kazakhstan. Consequently, in Kazakhstan 
online activism and extra-parliamentary participation are alternatives to institutionalised political 
participation; however, the latter can lead to problems with the law. 
A lack of knowledge about non-traditional forms of youth political participation in Kazakhstan may 
result in underestimating youth abilities and a mistaken belief that they are apolitical. Moreover, 
if youth research in Kazakhstan will continue to be primarily restricted to formal political 
participation, their inexplicable behaviour will be difficult to explain. The younger generation of 
Kazakhstan is not uninterested or uninformed about socio-political issues in the country. They stay 
interested and observe from afar; they do not alienate themselves from politics, but rather from 
its institutional forms.
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